It was one of the final days of the Texas legislature’s regular session in 2023. Along with the other staffers in the Democratic House minority leader’s office, I listened closely to the floor proceedings from the office television. SB 14, a bill to ban gender transition treatments for minors, had been called to the floor and a Houston Democratic lawmaker named Shawn Thierry was about to give a speech in its favor that would end her career. As she walked to the dais, her speech in one hand and tissue in the other, the chamber grew quiet. There was visible unease among both her Republican and Democratic colleagues as she began to speak. In a profession that rewards caution and punishes miscalculation swiftly, it is rare to watch an elected official willingly walk the plank.
In the months leading up to this moment, national and state progressive advocacy groups applied intense pressure on Thierry, going as far as to threaten to unseat her in a primary. Other members of the Democratic caucus discouraged her from breaking ranks, with one Democratic lawmaker urging her to “hold your nose” and vote against it with the rest of the party, particularly as the legislation would require no Democrat to pass through the Republican-controlled legislature. But Thierry made her decision clear. Her religious convictions and her own research required her to vote in favor of the legislation. Less than a year after that vote, progressive groups and aligned unions poured more than $1 million to help a hand-selected challenger defeat Thierry in a heated primary and runoff campaign.
As I watched the relentless campaign against Thierry unfold, I struggled to understand why the state party failed to defend one of its own from the progressive groups. The newly elevated issue of medical transition treatments for minors was far removed from the traditional positions of Democratic officials, such as civil rights, worker protections, and public education. But in this instance, it was treated as a defining test of loyalty. The party’s decision was made all the more perplexing by who Thierry was.
Shawn Thierry would seem to embody the modern Democratic Party: an African-American woman, a lawyer, and the daughter of a city maintenance worker and an English teacher. The generations of African-Americans who built her district of Sunnyside, Houston’s first black community, were working-class, Christian, and loyal to the Democratic Party. They helped deliver Texas for Kennedy and Johnson, under whose terms the Democrats passed sweeping civil rights legislation. But African-Americans, particularly older voters who form a significant share of the Democratic base, tend to be more socially conservative. Rather than see Thierry’s vote in favor of the ban as one that reflected the will of voters in her plurality-black district, the state Democratic party determined that allowing the progressive groups to remove Thierry was less costly than defending her.
Shortly after her loss, Thierry released a statement announcing she was leaving the Democratic Party. “The Democratic Party has veered so far left, so deep into the progressive abyss,” she wrote. “This is not the party I grew up with. I have witnessed firsthand how the so-called ‘liberal’ left now stifles thoughtful debate, silencing dissent with an iron fist—demanding blind allegiance to ideology, where one must comply or be cast out.”
Thierry is not the only Democratic state lawmaker forced out of the party by what the liberal commentators have come to call “The Groups.” Last year in Florida, former Senate Minority Leader Jason Pizzo, the highest-ranking Democratic elected official in the state, announced he was leaving the party, which he described as “dead” in his departure speech. In interviews following his decision, Pizzo spoke of mounting pressure from national consultants and advocacy groups pushing Democratic officials to prioritize socially divisive issues that he believed voters don’t actually care about. Ultimately, Pizzo said he had grown tired of working for a group of people with “no purpose on how to solve things with sound policy.”
In the aftermath of the defeat of Kamala Harris in the 2024 presidential election, a growing consensus has emerged among Democratic strategists that the party needs more moderate messaging and candidates to win and hold federal power. But the departures of Thierry and Pizzo expose a difficult reality for Democrats: There is little room within today’s party for genuine moderation.
“There is little room within today’s party for genuine moderation.”
Over the past decade, progressive advocacy networks have steadily accumulated influence over Democratic politics, particularly at the state and local level. In many cities and states, elected officials are no longer setting their own course on policy. Instead, a relatively small but highly organized ecosystem of national advocacy groups, politicized unions, and ideological nonprofits exerts outsized influence over the party’s candidate selection, legislative and policy drafting, and internal discipline.
Progressive groups exercise growing leverage over primary elections and supply ready-made legislation drawn from think tanks and, increasingly, directly from the Democratic Socialists of America platform. Over time, this dynamic has produced a steady leftward shift in major Democratic strongholds. The policies that follow are often ambitious and coherent in ideological terms, but insufficiently grounded in political and economic reality. The visible consequences of these local governing decisions—including rising crime and homelessness, fiscal strain and governance mismanagement—now shape how many voters perceive the Democratic Party as a whole. The party’s current national brand problem does not arise from their actions in Washington, but from the bad outcomes in cities and states where Democrats hold power.
At the height of the Covid pandemic, craving an escape from quarantine and eager for a new challenge, I moved to Texas to be a campaign manager in a competitive state house race, a role that put me near the center of the state’s Democratic politics. Part of my excitement about the role was the opportunity to answer a question many political observers ask about Texas: Why do Democrats continue to perform so poorly in an electorally consequential state whose racial demographics are essentially identical to those of deep blue California? There are several reasons. But after arriving, I began to see that one major factor was the weakness of the state party itself and the extent to which national progressive groups had become its de facto power center.
The state party’s institutional weakness becomes obvious the moment a Democratic candidate launches a campaign for general election. Even in competitive districts, they are expected to develop their own messaging, hire their own team, and fundraise on their own. This typically stands in contrast with their Republican opponents who often benefit from highly centralized campaign operations operated by one of a few political consulting firms that the state GOP and key party leaders pay directly to cover all campaign costs.
Because the state Democratic Party does not centralize candidate funding, candidates must build their own donor networks. That means seeking support from national progressive organizations and PACs that have the resources to fill the gap. To access this funding, my candidate and I spent hours completing detailed questionnaires that functioned as ideological purity tests. The answers determined whether we would receive money and how much. It also required us to place their organizational logos on the campaign’s website and display their form endorsement on social media channels. This meant adopting positions and messaging crafted by outside groups, often centered on abortion rights, LGBTQ issues, or national cultural debates that were not the dominant concerns of district voters. Our district covered large portions of San Antonio’s South Side, home to a working-class, socially conservative Hispanic population that was focused on jobs, public safety, and affordability. This left many voters we spoke to in our canvassing efforts feeling like our candidate was part of a party more focused on the issues of national groups willing to fund the campaign than the district’s needs. In a sense, they were correct.
“My candidate and I spent hours completing detailed questionnaires.”
When I later worked inside the state legislature as a staff member for the House minority leader, the power of progressive groups was even clearer. Teachers’ unions worked to make sure Democratic members who supported charter schools remained on the periphery of the party’s decision-making. They were also vigilant to ensure that no member broke ranks to support the governor’s school voucher program proposal. On socially divisive issues such as abortion, immigration, gun control, and criminal justice, progressive groups expected unwavering opposition to Republican proposals. Members were unable to vote in ways that reflected the diversity of viewpoints of their constituents. Their dependence on progressive groups also atrophied their ability to engage in independent thought and policymaking on less controversial issues, like fiscal policy and strengthening the state’s electric grid.
In Republican-controlled Texas, progressive capture makes it harder for Democrats to present themselves as a viable alternative to a broader segment of voters. In Democratic-controlled states and cities, where the electorate reliably votes for the party, by contrast, progressive capture operates with fewer electoral checks, driving the selection of increasingly left-leaning candidates and adoption of flawed policies.
The recent elections of socialist mayors Zohran Mamdani in New York City and Katie Wilson in Seattle illustrate this dynamic. Both emerged from progressive nonprofits before seeking elected office. Wilson led a group called the Seattle Transit Riders Union, which lobbied the mayor’s office and city council to expand transit funding and reduce fares. Before becoming a New York State Assembly member, Mamdani worked as a housing counselor at Chhaya CDC, a South-Asian serving nonprofit that receives state and city funding. Their trajectories reflect how progressive ecosystems not only shape political messaging and push for government funding but cultivate candidates from within their own ranks to deliver that promise.
“Mamdani worked as a housing counselor at Chhaya CDC, a South-Asian serving nonprofit.”
The influence of progressive groups is not limited to those they help elect. Even centrist Democrats who do not emerge from these networks govern within an environment shaped by their sustained pressure. Many elected Democratic governors, often the most moderate statewide elected officials, feel the pressure from progressive groups to support legislation and spending priorities that align with their demands but don’t always reflect sound governance.
In Illinois, a coalition of progressive groups pushed lawmakers to pass the SAFE-T Act that eliminated cash bail statewide in 2021. Today, there is growing backlash to the law amid a wave of physical assaults on Chicago public transit riders by repeat offenders who are being released from jail before trials. In the most high-profile case, Bethany MaGee, a 26-year-old female was set on fire by a mentally unbalanced criminal who was out on pretrial release at the time of the attack.
In California, a coalition of progressive groups has steadily pushed the state to expand eligibility of Medi-Cal, the state’s low-income health insurance program, to cover nearly 1.7 million non-citizens. Now the program faces cutbacks after the 2024-2025 projected cost of $6.4 billion ballooned to roughly $9.5 billion, requiring Gov. Gavin Newsom to take out a $3.44 billion dollar loan against the state’s general fund to cover the remainder of 2025. Rather than treating the shortfall as a signal to reconsider expanded coverage, progressive groups have doubled down, advancing a state ballot initiative called the “2026 Billionaire Tax Act” that would impose a 5 percent tax on the net worth of the state’s wealthiest residents to sustain it.
Unsound state laws and city policies advanced by progressive groups have become an increasingly visible feature of Democratic governance, one that many voters associate with the party nationally. President Trump seized on these examples during his reelection campaign, and his administration continues to spotlight their consequences.
For example, Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy has issued statements following fatal highway accidents involving noncitizen truck drivers, arguing that state licensing policies in places such as California and Pennsylvania create vulnerabilities in the commercial driver’s license system. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security regularly publicizes the criminal records of noncitizens arrested in jurisdictions whose sanctuary policies prevent federal officials from taking custody directly from local jails. By elevating these examples, the Trump administration is effectively converting local progressive policy choices into national brand issue for the Democratic Party, one the party has failed to acknowledge, much less counter.
In the aftermath of their 2024 presidential defeat, establishment Democrats spoke openly about the need to moderate the party’s image to reclaim federal power. But many centrist Democrats mistakenly assume that the national party’s favorability problem can be solved simply by selecting more moderate candidates and refining campaign messaging.
That narrow thinking stems from a decades-old assumption that Democratic power flows from the top down—that presidential nominees and congressional leaders define the party’s identity and platform, and state and local governments merely implement it. In this framework, dysfunction or mismanagement in a particular city or state can be dismissed as an isolated case, not a threat to the party’s national standing.
But since the end of President Obama’s second term in 2016, that assumption no longer holds. Instead, progressive groups have come to increasingly influence and shape the direction of Democratic governance at the local and state level in ways that are now more visible to voters than any action by the party in Washington.
The Democratic Party cannot moderate as long as progressive groups are able to exert control over the state and local party, pushing out moderates like Shawn Thierry and Jason Pizzo. Progressive policies have led to rising crime, uncontrolled spending, recurring fiscal shortfalls, higher taxes, and visible mismanagement. These outcomes do not remain siloed in one particular Democratic-controlled city or state. Instead, they are synthesized in the minds of voters as reflections of Democratic governance as a whole.
To deliver a moderate campaign vision, the national party needs to overcome this structural vulnerability by asserting more forcefully the party’s moderate identity and offering their state and local counterparts a real alternative incentive structure. This could include an effort led by one of the more centralized elements of the party, such as the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to support down-ballot Democratic candidates who run on moderate platforms, particularly in battleground states, as well as assurances from the state parties that they will protect moderate incumbents from primary challenges. Creating a moderate national platform would also require leaders to recognize when certain state and local policies and positions hurt the party’s reputation and work more quickly to offer local guidance and direction.
“JB Pritzker has pushed back against Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson.”
Three Democratic governors who are widely considered to be running in the early 2028 Democratic primary campaign are already trying to burnish their moderate bona fides. In Illinois, Gov. JB Pritzker has pushed back against Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson’s more extreme efforts to stop immigration enforcement. Pritzker has also blocked the mayor’s attempts to increase city taxes on high income earners to pay for an already bloated city budget. In California, Gov. Newsom has stated openly that he would veto the proposed “billionaire tax,” stating publicly his concern that such measures could accelerate business flight and discourage investment. And in Pennsylvania, Gov. Josh Shapiro is facing coordinated pressure from progressive lawmakers and advocacy groups that are leveraging his 2028 ambitions to push him toward a $850 million healthcare spending increase in the new budget that could require tax hikes in the swing state.
Successfully navigating these internal battles by asserting independence from progressive pressure while maintaining enough contrast with Republicans to energize the party’s base could signal the kind of national leadership capable of returning a Democrat to the White House. But moderation of the national Democratic Party cannot be accomplished through changes to campaign messaging alone. It requires regaining downward control over the policy direction of progressive Democratic-run states and cities. Without that restructuring, any presidential candidate promising to move the party to the center will remain tied to local outcomes they cannot distance themselves from.
The Democratic establishment’s failure to grapple with progressive capture at the state and local level does more than complicate efforts to moderate the party’s image. It also helps explain why Democrats continue to misread the political logic of President Trump’s second-term domestic agenda. That misreading carries real risk, particularly among the suburban and working-class voters the party must win back to remain competitive nationally.
Many Democrats have characterized the president’s decision to surge federal law enforcement operations, and at times National Guard deployments, into cities as evidence of authoritarian ambition or a desire to consolidate power. What is rarely confronted directly, however, is Trump’s stated rationale: that rising crime, resistance to immigration enforcement, fiscal instability, and visible mismanagement in urban areas governed by progressive Democratic leaders and policies justify federal intervention. Whether one agrees with that assessment is beside the point. It is the governing framework through which his administration understands its actions and communicates them to voters.
Consider Minnesota, where investigations into massive social-service fraud and protests over federal immigration enforcement operations have dominated headlines. In each case, Democratic leaders largely framed the issue as federal overreach or a partisan attack. There was no soul-searching over the state-level governance decisions and oversight failures that occurred under Gov. Tim Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison. The episode highlights what is shaping up to be the party’s playbook in President Trump’s second term: When confronted with governance failures in Democratic strongholds, Democrats will shift the debate to the optics of federal intervention rather than the underlying performance of state and local institutions.
That strategy may energize the party’s base in the short term, but it leaves untouched the conditions in progressive-dominated cities and states that made President Trump’s federal intervention platform politically viable. The Democratic Party cannot meaningfully moderate unless it reckons with how progressive capture has reshaped its governance and produced outcomes that have become liabilities not only to the party’s image, but more consequentially, to the institutional stability and fiscal integrity of the country itself.