Is that all there was? Did months of boastful promises to end the war in Ukraine really produce little more than an Oval Office tongue-lashing of Volodymyr Zelensky, a day of ceremonious summitry with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, and a several hours of cringe-inducing European obsequiousness toward President Trump in the White House? Has Trump finally conceded that his critics were correct that the Ukraine conflict can only end on the battlefield, and not at the negotiating table?
At first glance, that was the message of the president’s jarring Truth Social post. Upon further consideration, he proclaimed, he now believes that with continued support from NATO and tough economic pressure on Moscow, Ukraine can in fact defeat Russia and reclaim its lost lands. His closing, “Good Luck to all!,” appeared to signal that the United States will step back, allowing Ukraine and Russia to settle their differences on the battlefield, while providing Europeans long opposed to a compromise peace with the arms needed to pursue their preferred course of proxy warfare with Russia.
However, literal interpretations of Trump’s provocative public statements are almost always a mistake. A deeper reading suggests that he is not quite ready to throw in the towel on diplomacy. Rather, his post appears carefully calibrated to jolt all the parties—Ukrainians, Russians, and Europeans—into more realistic negotiating positions on the terms of a peace settlement by playing upon the fears of each.
“For Europe, Trump’s message was in essence a poison pill.”
For Europe, Trump’s message was in essence a poison pill. Granted, he appeared to concede the arguments of European hardliners that compromise with Russia is both impossible and undesirable, and that toughened resolve can eventually force Putin’s capitulation without requiring any painful Ukrainian and Western concessions to Russian demands.
But these hardliners have limited ability to sustain this proxy war with Russia without robust American involvement. A deeply indebted Ukraine now spends at least $170 million each day to sustain its wartime economy, and it depends on large outlays of economic aid from its friends to meet its needs. How long can cash-strapped Europe afford this largesse, including the purchases of expensive American weapons for Ukraine that the United States will no longer provide on credit?
Moreover, despite their tough rhetoric, do Europeans really have the appetite to risk a direct military confrontation with Russia without clear assurances that the US cavalry will ride to their rescue if push comes to shove? Europe’s leaders surely noticed Trump’s disregard for their preferred pronouns, referring to NATO as “they” not “we.” Such wording spoke volumes, dangling the prospect of a US retreat not just from peacemaking in Ukraine, but from European alliance commitments more broadly. That prospect, much more than continued war in Ukraine, is Europe’s biggest security concern.
Ukraine harbors similar fears of abandonment, worrying that the West is quite content to fight to the last Ukrainian, but loath to risk any direct participation in fending off Russia. The unstated implication behind Trump’s post—that Ukrainians should expect many more months if not years of continued attritional warfare with a much larger and better supplied Russian army, even as the United States winds down its involvement in the conflict—cannot be altogether encouraging to an increasingly exhausted Ukrainian population.
Ironically, Trump changed his rhetoric about Ukraine’s chances to regain its lost territory only days after Zelensky told ABC News that a victory would mean “keeping our country,” not regaining its pre-2014 borders, as he had long insisted. Zelensky is undoubtedly aware of a disturbing trend: While Kyiv has struggled with military manpower problems, Russia is on track to increase its forces in Ukraine by 150,000 soldiers this year, and the Russian military is consistently exceeding its monthly recruitment plans. Unlike defending against Russian advances, driving Russia back from occupied territory will require at least a 3 to 1 manpower advantage—a ratio that is unimaginable given Ukraine’s recruitment problems.
For Russia, Trump’s post elicits concerns of a different type. Putin has little fear that Ukraine can drive Russian forces out of Crimea or the Donbass, nor are the strains on its economy anywhere near sufficient to force him to quit the war. Rather, Russia worries that the window of opportunity for restoring some kind of normalcy to its relations with the United States may close. This would leave Moscow uncomfortably dependent on China, facing an enlarged and rearming NATO alliance that is poised to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Germany for the first time since the now defunct INF Treaty banned them.
Russia has few good options for dealing with these threats absent a compromise settlement in Ukraine. Relying on nuclear weapons to deter NATO would place Russian security once again on the hair-trigger that Soviet leaders found so discomfiting in the 1980s. Countering NATO with conventional forces would put an enormous burden on Russia’s economy, starving it of the technological innovation and civilian dynamism necessary if Moscow wants to compete with the world’s economic heavyweights. Subordinating itself to China would hardly be consistent with Russia’s aspirations to be one of the poles in the world’s emerging multipolar order.
If Russia is to be the great power Putin and other Russian elites envision, it must have normal relations with the United States and use negotiations to mitigate the threats it faces in Europe. Trump’s post has almost certainly forced Russia to contemplate the implications of failed rapprochement with Washington.
No doubt, Trump’s post is a gamble. If it does not pay off in more flexible negotiating positions from Russia, Europe, and Ukraine, he will have little choice but to pull back from his peacemaking agenda in Ukraine. Absent a compromise settlement in Ukraine, Europe would be left with an open wound for years to come, which in turn could radiate instability into Moldova, Belarus, Kaliningrad, the Balkans and other looming hotspots. The prospects of great power conflict would grow, and Trump’s hope that a more peaceful international order will allow him to focus on America’s acute domestic problems would be dashed.
That may be why, in response to a reporter’s question about whether he has lost trust in Putin, Trump replied, “I will let you know in about a month from now.” His patience may well be waning, but Trump has not decided to walk away from the negotiating table in Ukraine altogether.
At least not yet.
Note: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.