In 2016, Donald Trump grabbed headlines by declaring the war in Iraq “a big fat mistake,” accusing George W. Bush of starting a foolish war and wasting billions of dollars. His remarks were shocking to Republican elites, but remarkably popular among voters, for whom the war had long since become a lost cause. For most of his first term, and even the start of his second, President Trump largely avoided the siren call of “forever wars” in the Middle East, negotiating an exit from Afghanistan and keeping campaigns against ISIS, the Houthis, and Iran’s nuclear program short and sweet.
Today, however, he is on the slippery slope to endless war that he judged other presidents for taking. If Donald Trump doesn’t want to be counted among their number by history, it’s time to declare victory in Iran.
The US and Israeli campaign in Iran has enjoyed some modest success, particularly in degrading Iranian military infrastructure. According to US Central Command, airstrikes have hit over 5,000 targets, including missile launchers, naval vessels, and various defense industrial targets. Though the United States has been unable to fully degrade Iran’s ability to fight back—particularly given the proliferation of drones, small boats, and other easily concealed weapons—it will undoubtedly take the Iranians years to build back what they have lost.
At the same time, it is increasingly apparent that more significant governance changes in Iran are not forthcoming. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told Congress in testimony earlier this week that the regime is “degraded but intact,” suggesting that the government remains relatively secure. Indeed, the war has highlighted the extent to which Iran’s leadership, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), still exert strong control over the country’s society and economy.
Operation Epic Fury, now entering its fourth week, has thus achieved about as much as possible; further achievements are relatively unlikely. At the same time, a prolonged war substantially increases the risks of both escalation and the costs of the campaign.
“Further achievements are relatively unlikely.”
For one thing, the pressure to escalate will only grow as the war continues, a pattern seen in wars throughout history. In Vietnam, what began as American air strikes eventually turned into several hundred thousand troops on the ground. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the failures of nation building created the circumstances for the now infamous “surges,” the rise of ISIS, and a twenty-year quagmire.
Indeed, the tendency to escalate is an all too natural one. If one cannot achieve one’s objectives with current means, it’s tempting to argue that more should be done. The sunk cost fallacy also plays a role here: It can be hard to de-escalate in light of already spent blood and treasure. There are reports that the White House is considering sending more troops to the region, or even some kind of ground incursion into Iran, but little on the details. This is because all the options for escalation are bad: risky and likely to be ineffective.
A Special Forces mission to seize Iran’s enriched uranium from the tunnels at Isfahan, for example, would involve inserting American forces under fire into an enclosed tunnel system and escaping with hundreds of pounds of material. Proposals to seize and occupy Kharg Island—the nerve center of Iran’s oil exports—would involve fighting entrenched forces, then holding a position only fifteen miles offshore of the Iranian coast, well within range of not just rockets but old-fashioned artillery.
The most expansive option under discussion is the notion that American forces could occupy some kind of buffer ground on the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz in order to eliminate threats to shipping. This would be a massive undertaking featuring tens or hundreds of thousands of troops, without truly eliminating anything but the short-range threats to the Strait.
That these are the options under discussion should tell you something about how poor the military option set is in Iran. Yet even as escalation is unlikely to be effective, as the war stretches into its fourth, fifth, and sixth week, there will be growing pressure to prevent further costs to the global economy and the American consumer.
These costs are already mounting. The price of crude oil in global markets has not spiked as much as one might have expected, but traders are increasingly noting the disparity between the physical trade in oil and the paper trade seen in markets. Prices in Asia, which draws its supplies from the Gulf, have already surpassed $200 a barrel. These costs will become globalized in coming weeks. Americans who have already seen prices at the pump rise 60 to 80 cents a gallon in less than a month are going to see further increases as the war continues.
Price jumps related to escalation are also more likely the longer the war lasts. The long-running reluctance on both sides to hit oil and gas production infrastructure is starting to crumble. Last week saw attacks on the refineries, oil fields, and LNG facilities in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. These strikes are a significant escalation, attacking not just the transport of oil, but also the equipment used to produce it. The result will be extra cost and time to repair these facilities and long-term impacts on global energy markets.
There is only one reasonable conclusion: It is time to get off this train before it speeds up even further.