Since at least 2003, when Donald Rumsfeld contrasted the “old Europe” of France and Germany with the “new” Europe made up of central European countries, commentators have stressed the difference between Western and Central Europe. While conservatives like Rumsfeld often see Central Europe as a source of vitality, many liberals regard it as a zone of “democratic backsliding.” Both perspectives fail to see the profound internal divisions that must be overcome if Central Europe is to emerge as a coherent geopolitical bloc.
The first significant division is between Central European elites and the broader society. Even though Central Europe may appear to be a bastion of resistance to Brussels ideology and a partner for global players, most elite Central Europeans have become distinctly westernized. Political leaders, officials, journalists, NGO representatives, and academics often develop a strong loyalty to Brussels which trumps their national loyalty. And those who don’t necessarily identify with the West often incline toward it nonetheless, because it offers them better financial and career prospects.
“The West is not the only force seeking to shape the region.”
Of course, the West is not the only force seeking to shape the region. More than ten years ago, China launched the 14+1 format of economic cooperation with former communist countries to improve its access to the European market. In response, Washington supported the Three Seas Initiative, connecting transport and energy infrastructure of countries between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas to broaden its LNG market and to get a foothold between Germany and Russia.
The Westernized elite stands and falls with the importance of the European Union. If Brussels’ plans for further centralization are fulfilled, the influence of its allies and servants in the member states will also grow. But this is not very likely. In light of the catastrophic failures of EU policies (the Green Deal, Covid vaccine purchases, arming Ukraine, anti-Russian sanctions, and mass migration), it is more likely to expect a crisis in European institutions, which will open up space for more intensive cooperation among Central European nations. However, this can only succeed if Central Europe is able to politically come to terms with its internal diversity.