When Slovak-born tycoon Andrej Babiš prevailed in the recent Czech elections, international media outlets showered him with all kinds of labels—“populist,” “nationalist,” “hard-right billionaire,” “Euro-skeptic,” “Trumpist”—and warned that his return to power signaled a pro-Russian turn in the Central European nation.
In fact, it is difficult to pin down Babiš’s politics. When he served a previous term as prime minister from 2017 to 2021, he tended toward centrist policies and avoided conflicts both at home and in Europe. Until last year, his movement ANO was in the same faction in the European parliament as French President Emmanuel Macron’s party. But this alignment didn’t stop Babiš from also praising Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whom he later joined in the Patriots faction of the European Parliament.
It is still unclear who will join the new government. Babiš’s party won 80 seats in parliament, and must find at least 21 more to secure a majority. The most natural partner—with 13 seats—is the neoliberal, slightly Euro-skeptical, strongly climate-skeptical party called Motorists for Themselves, which embraces the political legacy of former President Václav Klaus. Babiš will be able to achieve a parliamentary majority of 108 seats if he adds the national-conservative, sovereigntist, and—according to the liberal media—“extreme right-wing” SPD. These three parties were the core of the opposition to the outgoing progressive government.
“Czechia should prepare for a major upheaval.”
Judging by what the leaders of the two junior parties have been saying, Czechia should prepare for a major upheaval. The SPD, which sits in the European Parliament in a faction led by Germany’s AfD, has been advocating referendums on leaving the European Union and NATO and rejects anti-Russian sanctions. The Motorists don’t go that far, but they have based their political identity on rejecting the EU Green Deal and the entire Brussels bureaucracy. In the European Parliament, they sit in the Patriots faction alongside representatives of Orbán’s party and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally.
Babiš himself is considerably more moderate. He is a fierce critic of the Green Deal, but voted for it as prime minister in Brussels. Despite his great respect for Orbán, he does not want to be put in the same group with him as he fears political isolation in the European Parliament. Despite all the criticism he directs at the European Union and NATO over the war in Ukraine, he is unlikely to be as vocal on Ukraine as Orbán or Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. He wants to be both the voice of the dissatisfied citizenry and a respected partner for Brussels.
Babiš must also attempt to avoid serious conflict with President Petr Pavel, an ally of the outgoing government, who according to the constitution must appoint the government. The president made it clear that he could hardly make anyone a minister who raises doubts about Czech membership in NATO and the European Union. Having been trained as a military intelligence officer by a communist regime, the Czech president turned into a stalwart defender of “Euro-Atlantic values” in the 1990s. Conditioning his approval of the ministers on their adherence to the European Union and NATO, Pavel is probably overstepping constitutional limits on his power. But Babiš is not interested in a prolonged court battle—and in any case, has no interest in withdrawing from either institution.
Babiš is not the only pragmatist in the room. Both the Motorists and the SPD are likely willing to backtrack on some of their electoral promises in exchange for a role in the new government. In case they demand too much, Babiš can turn to parties from the outgoing government—three of which are likely to consider such an offer.
Hence, although no major foreign policy shifts are expected in Prague, a pragmatic turn is likely. Within Central Europe, Babiš will revive relations with Fico’s Slovakia and Orbán’s Hungary which broke down under the outgoing progressive government over Ukraine and other ideological disputes. This, in turn, will cool relations with the anti-Moscow zealots of Poland and the Baltic States. When it comes to Brussels, Babiš will be more like Giorgia Meloni than Viktor Orbán.
As for the United States, Babiš supported Trump and may appreciate some of his policies, but does not like his tariffs nor the expectation he has imposed on Europe to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. Babiš knows that his country cannot afford this. He is likely to avoid openly defying Trump, and at the same time to look for ways to circumvent him. If Babiš manages to form a government, Czech foreign policy will turn away from ideology to pragmatism.